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Summary 
Husserl’s involvement in the debate on intentionality by the School of Brentano 
raises the hope of establishing an indirect link between him and the early analyt-
ic philosophy, since Russell, in the course of formulating his theory of descrip-
tions, extensively discussed Meinong’s theory of objects. I examine whether 
Husserl could be connected to the position Russell criticized. I also study an 
unpublished manuscript of Husserl from 1907 which proves that he read Rus-
sell’s critique of Meinong, and I try to connect it to Husserl’s own critique of 
Meinong and to Husserl’s earlier position. Although Husserl was finally reluc-
tant to consider Russell’s arguments, I believe that this analysis could still pro-
vide important insights into Husserl’s unique transcendental phenomenological 
position. 
1. Introduction: Russell’s Debate with Meinong 
By around 1920, Husserl successfully ruined the two most promising 
chances for an interaction between his phenomenology and the nascent 
analytic philosophy. As recent advances in Husserl scholarship show, both 
Bertrand Russell’s planned review of the Logical Investigations1 and the 
                                                 
1 Since this episode is surrounded by various myths, it might be worth a closer 
look. “A new edition of your ‘Logische Untersuchungen’”, Russell wrote to 
Husserl in 1920, “was one of the books I had with me in prison” (Husserl 1994, 
vol. 6, 367; this fact is also confirmed by Russell’s handwritten list of “Philo-
sophical Books read in prison”, Russell 1986, 316). Contrary to a widespread 
view, however, in this letter Russell makes no mention of his earlier intention to 
review Husserl’s book in the Mind, which is mentioned only in a prison letter of 
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reception of Husserl’s guest lectures in London2 were jeopardized by what 
were almost conscious decisions on Husserl’s part to prefer forays into his 
                                                                                                                                                        
Russell containing a message to G. F. Stout: “Please tell Professor Stout […] 
that if he still wants review of Husserl’s Logical Investigations, I will do it in 
time for the October ‘Mind’. I have only 1st volume & half of 2nd. If the other 
half of 2nd has appeared & he has it, will he please send it?” (Bertrand Russell’s 
letter to Frank Russell et al., June 10, 1918 (unpublished), Ms. Russell, Class: 730 
Document No.: 079973, unnumbered 3) This message seems to confirm that it 
was Husserl’s questionable editing policy of his Logische Untersuchungen what 
impeded Russell’s review: In 1913 Husserl decided to elevate his earlier work to 
the position of transcendental phenomenology by progressively revising its parts 
for a new edition. He published a partially edition in October, which was in Rus-
sell’s hand, carrying a preface in which Husserl claimed that the closing part is 
“now in the press” (Husserl 1975, 15, (orig. XVI); quoted English translation 
(hereafter abbreviated as: ET): Husserl 2001, 8). This was, however, far from 
being the case, and already in December Husserl opted for a tabula rasa rewrit-
ing of the remaining part (see e.g. Husserl 1994, vol. 3, 531), which ended in-
conclusively in the summer. The closing volume appeared only in 1921. It is not 
only that the resulting situation must have rightly annoyed Russell, but Husserl’s 
decision to elevate his work to a different philosophical position via piecemeal 
changes in the text (see his own declaration: Husserl 1975, 10 ff.) would have 
seriously confused Russell, had he written this review (of which no extant man-
uscript is known). 
2 Already Herbert Spiegelberg, a post-war pioneer of the Anglo-Saxon reception 
of phenomenology, was convinced that Husserl’s lectures (published almost 70 
years later: Husserl 1999) were instrumental in jeopardizing the benevolent in-
terest of early analytic philosophers towards phenomenology: “The first lesson 
from the London lectures one might be tempted to draw is simply: How not to 
do it. [...] [I]t is now perfectly clear that Husserl was not so much interested in 
helping a specifically British audience, but in working out a general introduction 
into his evolving ‘system’ of transcendental phenomenology, something he had 
not yet tried before on this scale.” (Spiegelberg 1970, 12–13) What Spiegelberg 
was not yet aware, however, is that in the beginning of the manuscript prepara-
tion Husserl had asked a Canadian student of him, Winthrop Packard Bell, for 
advices on contemporary British philosophy (Husserl 1994, vol. 3, 36–38; Hus-
serl’s excerpts of Bell’s advices were hidden in a manuscript file); but then he 
has apparently abandoned his intention of catering for the specific needs of his 
audience (cf. ibid., 49). One of Bell’s remarks even concerned Bertrand Russell, 
who “helped logical intuition gain recognition” in England (ibid., 37). Husserl’s 
drive for systematic philosophy and his proverbial perfectionism (“I cannot sell 
my soul for a pottage of lentils of ‘famousness’ in England”, ibid., 45) prevented 
him not only from preparing the text of his lecture for publication at the Cam-
bridge University Press but also led him, when Gilbert Ryle, who was not pre-
sent at the London Lectures, later visited Husserl to lecture to Ryle “twice for an 
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transcendental phenomenology rather than presenting it to foreign audi-
ences. Given this regretful history of missed chances, it is compelling to 
look elsewhere for the signs of a relevant link between Husserl and the 
early analytic philosophy. As it is widely known, it suffices to open the 
issue of the journal Mind which published Bertrand Russell’s celebrated 
paper “On Denoting” in 1905, and turn circa 40 pages in order to find 
Russell’s appreciative review about Alexius Meinong.3  
Meinong also figures in Russell’s main paper as a proponent of the 
“simple” theory which “regards any grammatically correct denoting 
phrase as standing for an object. Thus ‘the present King of France,’ ‘the 
round square,’ etc., are supposed to be genuine objects. It is admitted that 
such objects do not subsist, but nevertheless they are supposed to be ob-
jects” (Russell 1905b, 482–483). Russell’s paper is based on logical “puz-
zles” to test the logical theories against them, and the theory that is at-
tributed to Meinong in Russell’s main paper apparently fails even the 
most basic test, as it “infringes the law of contradiction. It is contended, 
for example, that [...] the round square is round, and also not round; etc.” 
(ibid., 483). This is obviously claimed to be “intolerable” and any other 
theory must be preferred over Meinong’s one. 
However compelling this setting might be, it immediately raises sus-
picion, since Meinong appears to have been reduced here to the role of a 
mere representative of an inherently indefensible doctrine (“a well-
worked out instance of how not to philosophize”, as J. N. Findlay once 
put it).4 Interestingly, Russell was obviously aware of the merits of 
Meinong’s philosophy, as, in the aforementioned review of Meinong in 
the same issue, Russell openly admitted that the “value of [Meinong’s 
theory] appears to me to be very great” (Russell 1905c, 530). Meinong’s 
philosophy, as it is widely recognized today, was indeed far from being 
reducible to the representation of a manifest absurdity.5 Meinong tried to 
                                                                                                                                                        
hour on ‘Mein System’” (Schuhmann 1977, 340; this report is based on Ryle’s 
post-war recollections). 
3 Russell 1905c. – In order to facilitate the cross-checking of Husserl’s references 
to Meinong and Russell (see Section 3), I prefer to cite the original editions of 
their works. 
4 Findlay 1952, 16.  
5 For a classical exposition of the debate that also takes Meinong’s real position 
into account, see: Simons 1992. 
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grant full citizenship to non-existing objects like the ‘round square’ – i.e. 
to establish a third class of objects besides actually existing, real objects 
and subsisting, ideal objects – by strictly separating objects and sentences 
about objects (the so-called objectives). Every conceivable thing, even the 
‘round square’, can validly be regarded as an object, but the objective 
“The round square does not exist” is true and, at the same time, a subsist-
ing ideal entity. 
It is also important to keep in mind that Meinong did not argue for the 
introduction of the third class of existence – Außersein – on the basis of 
the dubitable claim that since non-existing objects could be constituents 
of valid sentences, they must be admitted as existing objects6 (this form of 
argumentation was called by Russell in his debate with the Scottish logi-
cian Hugh MacColl “the existential import of propositions”7). Actually, it 
was Russell himself, who had taken this position some years earlier and 
later falsely attributed it to Meinong. This confusion is particularly visible 
in Russell’s book My Philosophical Development, in which he claims the 
following:  
Meinong […] pointed out that one can make statements in which the logical 
subject is ‘the golden mountain’ although no golden mountain exists. He argued, 
if you say that the golden mountain does not exist, it is obvious that there is 
something that you are saying does not exist – namely the golden mountain; 
therefore the golden mountain must subsist in some shadowy Platonic word of 
being, for otherwise your statement that the golden mountain does not exist 
would have no meaning. I confess that, until I hit upon the theory of descrip-
tions, this argument seemed to me convincing. (Russell 1995, 64) 
The latter part of Russell’s claim is undeniably true: he did find this ar-
gument convincing, as his writings preceding the “On Denoting” and his 
letter to Frege in 1904 demonstrate.8 But Meinong introduced the third 
class of existence precisely in order to avoid fallacious argument like this 
                                                 
6 This is clearly stated by Meinong already during the first presentation of the 
full-fledged Gegenstandstheorie in 1904: “the being of an objective does not 
depend at all on the being of its object” (Meinong 1904, 12). He considered this 
type of fallacious argument to be based on a false mereological analogy which 
misconceives the constituents of the objective as real parts. 
7 See Russell 1905a, 400. 
8 For a concise overview of Russell’s development between 1903 and 1905 see 
Hylton 2003. 
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and to properly account for the status of ‘golden mountain’ in the sen-
tence ‘No golden mountain exists’: namely ‘golden mountains’ are non-
existing and non-subsisting objects and nothing more. 
Russell’s engagement with Meinong raises the idea to use it to con-
struct an indirect, multistage link between early analytic philosophy and 
early phenomenology. It was remarked already at the dawn of the post-
war Meinong renaissance – by John N. Findlay in the 1952 Meinong me-
morial volume – that Meinong’s “influence in Anglo-Saxon countries […] 
has possibly been greater than that in the German-speaking world” 
(Findlay 1952, 11). Findlay had already pointed out Russell’s articles in 
the Mind (ibid., 12) and Husserl’s Logical Investigations, “in which he 
[Husserl] comes nearest to the standpoint of Meinong” (ibid., 19). Gilbert 
Ryle similarly opened his keynote at the international Meinong confer-
ence in 1970 with the evaluation: “one important part of Meinong’s con-
tribution to twentieth-century thought is precisely the anti-Gegen-
standstheorie with which he vaccinated Brentano, Russell and Wittgen-
stein” (Ryle 1972, 2). Meinong’s philosophy could thus provide media-
tion between Russell and his continental counterparts. The enthusiasm for 
such a program surged after a text by Edmund Husserl was published in 
1979 in which he discussed precisely the problem of non-existing objects 
confronting Kazimir Twardowski, who was closely associated with 
Meinong during his Vienna period. Even the editor of Husserl’s text drew 
attention to the possible links to Russell (see Husserl 1979, XXX), and 
since then there have been repeated attempts to establish a multistage link 
between Husserl and Russell using Russell’s critique of Meinong and 
Husserl’s critique of Twardowski.  
In what follows, I first revisit this classical attempt in order to evalu-
ate its chances in the light of the advances of Husserl and Brentano schol-
arship. Although Husserl’s confrontation with the Brentano-School’s de-
bate on intentionality through Twardowski was indeed instrumental in the 
formation of his own notion of intentionality, I think that the chances of 
this program have been overestimated, and Husserl’s critique of Twar-
dowski cannot serve as a direct link between early analytic philosophy 
and phenomenology. There is, however, a hitherto unknown text, written 
by Husserl on the occasion of his revisiting of Meinong’s philosophy after 
his breakthrough to transcendental phenomenology, which could be con-
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sidered as Husserl’s direct confrontation with Russell’s debate with 
Meinong. I analyze this text in Section 3, and conclude that even if the 
immediate results of the analysis are negative, its lessons – together with 
some observations made during the investigation, including the remark of 
the contemporary editor of another version of Husserl’s text – could be 
used to make an important aspect of Husserl’s specific transcendental 
phenomenological position more understandable. 
 
2. The Indirect Link Through Husserl’s “Reaction Against 
Twardowski” 
The focal point of Husserl’s famous text is the problem raised by non-
existing objects or, to phrase it in the terminology of this debate, by 
presentations lacking an object (the so-called objectless presentations, ge-
genstand(s)lose Vorstellungen).9 The case of objectless presentations – 
e.g. the round square, the green virtue, or even the golden mountain10 – 
was highlighted by Bernard Bolzano in his Wissenschaftslehre in 1837, alt-
hough it should be noted that objectless presentations did not pose any 
problem in the objectivist ontology of Bolzano.11 The other aspects of Bol-
zano’s notion of objectless presentation are also worth a detailed look. Ob-
jectless presentations lack extension (Umfang), rather than having an emp-
ty extension. Bolzano formulates this as “a presentation having no object 
and […] being a presentation of nothing [nichts vorstellen]” (Bolzano 
1837, vol. 1, 304), which already anticipates why these presentations are 
going to occupy a central position in the debate on intentionality. Bolzano 
                                                 
9 As Wolfgang Künne has noted (Künne 2011, 84, n. 30), Husserl had actually mis-
quoted Bolzano’s term, because Bolzano did not use the linking element “s”.  
10 Bolzano 1837, vol. 1, 304 – I refrain from using an explicit notation for presen-
tations, as Bolzano himself did not resort to it and the lack of it is not going to 
cause misunderstandings in uncomplicated contexts. 
11 This is already indicated by the fact that the corresponding section (§ 67) was not 
underexposed by Bolzano, as if it would represent an inner contradiction or an 
aporetic passage. Quite the contrary; this section was marked by an asterisk, in-
dicating that it belonged to the core of the work. Bolzano also listed it among 
the essential sections in a letter in the penultimate year of his life (Bolzano 
2008, 158).  
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explicitly introduced the notion of objectless presentations in order to 
clarify the relations between an object, the mental realization of a presen-
tation – which he called a subjective or thought (gedachte) presentation –, 
and the objective presentation, which constitutes the matter (Stoff) of a 
subjective presentation. Even the presentation of nothing “has a matter, 
namely the objective concept [i.e. an objective conceptual presentation] 
of the nothing” (ibid.), but this presentation lacks any object.  
It is not to imply, however, that Bolzano’s notion of objectless presen-
tation was entirely unproblematic. In a diary note recorded after the pub-
lication of the Wissenschaftslehre, Bolzano himself came to recognize that 
the property of objectlessness must be understood in an atemporal sense 
(otherwise objective presentations would undergo contingent temporal 
alterations, thereby endangering the objective propositions [Sätze] about 
them).12 There is, however, a more sophisticated difficulty which Bolzano 
faced already in a subsequent paragraph of the Wissenschaftslehre. An 
important class of objectless presentations is formed by the so-called “im-
aginary presentations”, which are composite presentations consisting of 
contradicting partial presentations (e.g. the round square). While in the 
latter case the lack of object is immediately evident, Bolzano had to admit 
that there are presentations, like the regular pentahedron, which might re-
quire us to perform a complex chain of reasoning to be classified as ob-
jectless (Bolzano 1837, vol. 1, 318). Bolzano recognizes that this is an 
indication that the names of objectless presentations are not meaningless 
(bedeutungslos), unlike “abracadabra”, and that they could be thought of 
(even if we cannot always attach clear accompanying sensuous pictures 
(sinnliche begleitende Bilder) to them). While this seemed to have satis-
fied Bolzano, there is still an important aspect which remains unresolved 
here. The problem of objectless presentations is apparently not a static 
one, but there is a dynamic side as well: it might require us to perform a 
complex chain of reasoning in order to classify a presentation as object-
less (which, again, introduces the question of temporality). This does not 
                                                 
12 See Bolzano 1979, 65. In the Wissenschaftslehre he cites the “actually blossom-
ing grapevine” as a presentation “that could be objectless” (Bolzano 1837, vol. 
1, 305), even though it was in the previous section (§ 66,4) where he laid down 
that the extension of an objective presentation is temporally invariable (Bolzano 
1837, vol. 1, 299). 
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endanger Bolzano’s objectivist ontology, but it highlights the need to 
philosophically capture this “subjective” side as well. 
It is compelling to conceive the intense discussion on the intentionali-
ty by the students of Brentano as a result of the collision between Brenta-
no’s principle of the universal validity of intentionality – i.e. that every 
presentation is the presentation of something (cf. Brentano 1874, 115–
116) – and Bolzano’s claim that objectless presentations have no object. 
The feasibility of this often invoked historical picture depends on the non-
trivial question as to whether Brentano himself perceived objectless pre-
sentations as an anomaly calling for further explanation, or whether he 
regarded them as easily explicable, maybe because he was committed to 
the thesis that the intentionality of a presentation merely involves the 
presentation having an immanent mental object. In the latter case the 
problem would only emerge if intentionality is understood in the sense of 
aiming at the object itself, rather than at its mental substitute. This move 
is usually credited to the distinction between the content and object of a 
presentation, introduced in the early 1890s by Alois Höfler and Kazimierz 
Twardowski, the semi-orthodox disciples of Brentano. This historical 
view has been increasingly questioned in recent Brentano scholarship, as 
Brentano’s specific notion of intentionality turns out to be richer than 
previously assumed.13 In any case, it could be safely said that there was a 
distinct debate about the notion of intentionality among Brentano’s disci-
ples, which could be temporally and geographically circumscribed. For 
example, Carl Stumpf’s psychology and logic lectures in Halle in 1888–
1887, which the young Husserl preparing for his habilitation examination 
attended, definitely antedate this debate (Schuhmann 2000, 65), which 
                                                 
13 See e.g. Rollinger 2012, who makes the point that the proper reconstruction of 
Brentano’s notion of intentionality presupposes a reliable chronology and edi-
tion of his manuscript notes (262 ff.), especially that of the planned continuation 
of his epoch-making Psychology. This would explain why Chrudzimski deemed 
the “historical question” concerning Brentano’s notion of intentionality “practi-
cally unanswerable” (Chrudzimski 2005, 18). The first philologically sound in-
terpretations of Brentano’s notion of intentionality which went beyond the 
immanentist thesis were offered around the millennium (Antonelli 2000, 
Chrudzimski 2001). 
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would explain why Husserl ascribed this debate to a wing of the school, 
rather than to his masters.14  
It is also hard to precisely locate the origins of this debate, as it would 
involve answering the elusive question as to how Brentano’s disciples 
came to recognize the significance of Bolzano’s general theoretical phi-
losophy. Brentano himself was, of course, aware of Bolzano’s achieve-
ments and he referred to him extensively in his lectures, as Husserl’s lec-
ture notes from 1884–1885 demonstrate.15 However, Brentano’s refer-
ences had been mostly confined to Bolzano’s Paradoxes of the Infinite, 
and he reacted in an extremely hostile way when he was later confronted 
with the growing preference towards Bolzano among his former stu-
dents.16 The fateful rediscovery of Bolzano was probably made by several 
disciples of Brentano, especially by Benno Kerry and Alois Höfler (may-
be independently of each other),17 and the debate on the definition of con-
tent and object is perceptibly marked by the presence of Bolzano and his 
idea of objectless presentations. 
This historical overview of the origins of the debate already hints at 
the possibility of a subtle but significant displacement of Bolzano’s origi-
nal position, and it is indeed worth taking a closer look at Höfler logic 
handbook published in 1890 under the nominal co-authorship of 
Meinong, which is usually considered the first document of the content-
object-distinction. Höfler’s handbook, originally intended for secondary 
school use in the Habsburg Monarchy, explicitly contained the distinction 
between the content (Inhalt) of a presentation and its object (Gegen-
stand). The content is an immanent mental entity and the object, which is 
not a mental entity, is referred by the presentation in virtue of its object 
(Höfler 1890, 7). In a part of Höfler’s handbook, which Husserl annotated 
                                                 
14 It is hard to decide which notion of intentionality Husserl has encountered dur-
ing his studies at Brentano, since his student notes, which he had donated to the 
Brentano Archives in Prague in 1935, were destroyed during the Second World 
War. 
15 See Ms. Husserl Y 3 / 10 ff. Cf. Kraus 1919, 157. 
16 See Husserl 1994a, vol. 1, 31 and Brentano 1946, 125, where Brentano uses the 
same condemnation (Bolzano “als Lehrer und Führer”). Shortly after the second 
letter he assured Oskar Kraus, his loyal disciple, that he “has never ever experi-
enced the slightest influence” from Bolzano (Brentano 1966, 202). 
17 For an overview see Künne 1997, 31 ff. 
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in his own copy, we find a detailed classification of presentations includ-
ing the distinction between intuitive and non-intuitive presentations. The 
latter presentations are the results of abstraction based on intuitive com-
ponents, e.g. the temperature of the sun, a green dodecahedron or a tone 
that is ten octave higher than the highest tone ever heard (ibid., 26). This 
classification inevitably leads to the question of presentations like the 
round square, which Höfler termed incompatible (unverträgliche) presen-
tations (ibid.). There is, however, a telling passage in the text when Höfler 
raises the question as to whether incompatible presentations “could be 
presented [vorstellen] at all?” (ibid.). He opts for an affirmative answer by 
using an argumentation that may sound familiar:  
For how could I judge […] that a round square cannot exists, if I were not able 
to present it somehow [wenn das zu Beurtheilende nicht irgendwie vorgestellt 
werden könnte]? (ibid.). 
The stage is also set for the return of the existential import of proposi-
tions. 
Before turning our attention to Husserl’s role in this debate, it is 
worth taking a quick look at Twardowski’s book which prompted Hus-
serl’s response. Twardowski belonged to a later generation of Brentano 
disciples and had probably no personal contact with Husserl in Vienna.18 
                                                 
18 Even this basic fact was hitherto unclear in the Husserl and Brentano scholar-
ship. Robin D. Rollinger once conjectured that “[d]uring the year 1885, when 
Husserl and Twardowski were both studying under Brentano, they must have 
had some contact with another” (Rollinger 1999, 139). This, however, could not 
have been the case, since Twardowski began his university studies at the Faculty 
of Law in WS 1885/86, and in this semester he did not attend any class by Bren-
tano (see Brożek 2011, 99 ff.). Furthermore, Brożek believes that Twardowski 
did not actually attend his classes in this semester (ibid., 101). In any case, a l-
ready in December 1885 Twardowski moved to the Galician settlement Yezupil 
(Polish: Jezupol). He only spent two months in Vienna in the SS 1886, when he 
officially enrolled for some courses (ibid., 113), which, however, do not coin-
cide with Husserl’s courses in this semester. Twardowski returned to the Univer-
sity of Vienna only in WS 1886/87 (ibid., 114), but at that time Husserl was al-
ready in Halle in Germany. Although it would be theoretically possible that 
Twardowski attended Brentano’s unannounced advanced private seminar during 
his stay in the spring of 1886 (where he could have met Husserl), it seems to be 
highly improbable, since his first documented encounter with Brentano took 
place only in WS 1887/88 (ibid., 119). Had he attended Brentano’s advanced 
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However, he demonstrably sent his doctoral thesis to Husserl around De-
cember 189119 maybe as a gesture to capture the benevolence of an older 
disciple of Brentano, who possessed a higher academic rank. Twardowski 
either similarly sent his habilitation thesis to Husserl in 1894, or Husserl 
himself became aware of it while preparing for a review of recent logical 
literature that Natorp had assigned him.20 Twardowski himself admitted 
that his habilitation thesis was motivated not only by “the spirit of Bren-
tano” but also by Bolzano, whom he had discovered through Benno Kerry 
(Twardowski 1991, 11). Twardowski’s declared goal was to develop the 
distinction between content and object, as proposed precisely by Höfler’s 
handbook. It must be taken into account, however, that Twardowski’s po-
sition was far from being invariable. It is not only that he left Vienna in 
the winter semester of 1895, but he was at that time continuously experi-
menting with new configurations of contemporaneous logical ideas.21 For 
the purposes of this paper, the most important aspect of Twardowski’s ha-
bilitation work is that he tried to solve these difficulties by advancing the 
bold claim that most of the objectless presentations actually do have an 
object. How is that possible? In case of some presentations, like the 
                                                                                                                                                        
seminar in SS 1886 without any previous studies at Brentano (which is improb-
able on its own), he surely should have registered himself for Brentano’s an-
nounced lectures in the subsequent WS 1886/87. So it seems that Husserl and 
Twardowski did not study together in Vienna, let alone at Brentano. 
 These conclusions are also reinforced by the results of my research in the ar-
chives of the University of Vienna (cf. Ms. UA Vienna Phil. Nationalen 1886–
1887), which indicate that Twardowski did not officially register himself for a 
course by Brentano between SS 1886 and SS 1887 (but he attended several clas-
ses of Robert Zimmermann). None of the courses Twardowski registered for in 
SS 1886 were attended by Husserl (cf. Varga 2015). 
19 This is proved by Husserl’s unpublished letter of thanks dated December 22, 
1891, in which he acknowledged the receipt of Twardowski’s book. This letter 
was apparently hitherto unknown (cf. Schuhmann 1993, 41; Rollinger 1999, 139), 
so I quote it in full: “Sehr geehrter Herr[,] [i]ch sage Ihnen meinen besten Dank 
für die freundliche Zusendung Ihrer Abhandlung, die ich in diesen Ferientagen 
mit Interesse lesen werde. Hochachtungsvoll ergebenst[,] Dr. E[dmund] G[ustav] 
Husserl[.] Halle, a[n dem] T[ag] 22[.] XII. [18]91” (Ms. Twardowski 1771 (K-02-
1-11 174r)). The tone of Husserl’s letter also points to the fact that there was little 
(if any) personal acquaintance between them. 
20 See Schuhmann 1993, 41–42. 
21 In an 1897 letter to Meinong he announced his intention to “combine the Bren-
tano-Meinong-Höfler theory with that of Sigwart” (Meinong 1965, 144).  
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presentation of ‘nothing’, Twardowski employed a transformation that is 
very similar to Russell’s theory of descriptions. Instead of the sentence 
‘Nothing is forever’ one should mean, according to Twardowski, the sen-
tence ‘There is not any thing which is forever’ (cf. Twardowski 1894, 23). 
He might have opted for this solution concerning every objectless presen-
tation, which would have brought him close to Bertrand Russell’s trans-
formation of the sentence ‘The present king of France is bald’ (apart from 
the logical apparatus used by Russell, of course). But Twardowski chose a 
different solution by claiming that other types of objectless presentations 
do have an object, but only in a modified sense.22 It is thus justified to 
consider Twardowski’s habilitation thesis a forerunner of Meinong’s full-
fledged Gegenstandstheorie, which raises the question as to where Hus-
serl is situated in this debate. 
Until the middle of the 1890s, circa 6 years before the Logical Inves-
tigations, Husserl was not particularly concerned about the problem of 
intentionality. In fact, the word intentionality is barely mentioned in Hus-
serl’s philosophical writings.23 The first reported philosophical writing of 
Husserl addressed the “problem of continuum” (Brentano / Stumpf 2014, 
260), a rather mathematical topic, which corresponds to the earliest known 
manuscript of Husserl, titled “Homogeneous and inhomogeneous contin-
ua” (Ms. Husserl K I 50 / 47a), which hardly goes beyond the domain of 
mathematics. Husserl’s first surviving work, a part of his habilitation thesis 
published under the title “On the Notion of the Number”, similarly to his 
Philosophy of Arithmetic, published in 1891, could be classified as a treat-
ment of foundational problems of mathematics, including numbers, calcu-
                                                 
22 Twardowski distinguished between proper existence, which the objects of ob-
jectless presentations lack, and existence in a modified sense, which is assigned 
to the objects of objectless presentations (Twardowski 1894, 24 ff.). He ex-
plained the modified sense by analogy to the modification of the word ‘friend’ 
in the noun phrase ‘false friend’ (a ‘false friend’ is not a friend proper, in con-
trast to e.g. a ‘true friend’, which preserves the proper sense of ‘friend’). This 
distinction belongs to the shared Brentanoian doctrines (see Brentano 1874, 288; 
although Husserl – and maybe even Twardowski encountered it through Brenta-
no’s lectures, cf. Ms. Husserl Y Brentano 2 / 42). It must be added that this dis-
tinction was familiar to Bolzano as well, who, interestingly, also used it in one 
of his last letters to analyze the status of subjective presentations (Bolzano 2006, 
229). 
23 See Schuhmann 2004, 119. 
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lus etc., by the devices of a general philosophical psychology. It is telling 
that his habilitation thesis was subtitled “psychological analyses” and his 
latter book “psychological and logical investigations”. In fact at the begin-
ning of the 1890s, Husserl could have started a career in mathematical log-
ic as he proposed an intensional translation of extensional logic in a journal 
called Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie (Quarterly for 
Scientific Philosophy). Unfortunately for the young Husserl, but fortunate-
ly for the history of philosophy, his attempt proved to be a catastrophic 
failure, and he even became involved in a priority and plagiarism debate. 
In the following years, Husserl was writing a book on space, which, seen in 
retrospect from his mature genetic phenomenology, could be considered as 
the anticipation of the analysis of the constitution of space, but, at that 
time, it was still conceived as a contribution to the descriptive psychologi-
cal foundation of mathematics. However, this project also came to a stand-
still around 1893–94, due to, as Husserl has noted, “difficulties with the 
notion of intuition, the intuitive presentation in contrast to conceptual 
ones” (Husserl 1979, 452). This led Husserl to address the problem of 
presentations in general, penning a series of essays, two of which were 
published under the title “Psychological Studies” at the turn of the year. 
But even these attempts ended inconclusively. Husserl had spent the early 
1894 with reading William James, until Twardowski’s book was published 
in Vienna, which was explicitly dedicated to the structure and anomalies of 
intentional acts. Husserl was apparently so excited about this book that he 
immediately wrote down “a reaction against Twardowski”, as he described 
his text later (Husserl 1994a, vol. 1, 144). Husserl repeatedly revisited and 
reworked this text, so it could be safely considered one of the key texts of 
the genesis of Husserl’s philosophy.  
The beginning of the surviving portion of the text clearly sets Husserl 
in the context of this debate:  
If every presentation presents an object, then there is an object for every presen-
tation, and therefore: Every presentation has a corresponding object. On the oth-
er hand, it is considered to be indubitably true that not every presentation has a 
corresponding object; there to speak with Bolzano, ‘objectless presentation’ […] 
for instance […] a ‘round square’.24 
                                                 
24 Husserl 1990, 142; ET: Rollinger 1999, 251. Note that the version published in 
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First of all, it is important to see, as mentioned above, that this is a rela-
tively new development in Husserl’s thinking. In fact, before his reading 
of Twardowski’s book in the summer of 1894. Husserl did not share the 
basic principles that raise the problem of the intentionality of objectless 
presentations. This is nicely illustrated by a less-known passage, which 
Husserl wrote in 1891: 
[There are] two very different things: namely (1) whether a signification [Be-
deutung …] belongs to a name, and (2) whether or not there exists an object cor-
responding to a name. ‘Meaningless’ names in the strict sense are names with-
out a signification – pseudo names such as ‘Abracadabra’. But ‘round square’ is 
a univocal common noun to which, however, nothing can in truth correspond. 
(Husserl 1979, 12; ET: Husserl 1994b, 60) 
In other words, Husserl could have easily chosen the most simple solu-
tion: there is no problem at all, objectless presentations simply lack ob-
jects. The fact that he did choose this option in 1891 clearly indicates that 
he was not at all concerned about Brentano’s thesis of intentionality after 
he had left Vienna. In 1894 Husserl’s relation to Brentano’s notion appar-
ently underwent a complete change. Husserl himself explains this transi-
tion in the following passage: 
[I]t seems that we may […] ascribe to every presentation a meaning, but not a 
reference to something objective. This tendency is however counterbalanced by 
a new consideration, It is […] correct for us to say ‘»a round square« presents 
an object which is at the same time round and square, but there is certainly no 
such object’.25 
The question we must answer, however, is how Husserl’s own solution 
compares to the theories of other disciples of Brentano. What is relatively 
easy to see is which solutions were opposed by Husserl. There is a naive 
solution which would introduce a mental picture (“geistiges Abbild ”, Hus-
serl 1990, 143) that it supposed to mediate the intentional relation. Ac-
cording to this popular view, the problem of objectless presentations is 
easy to solve since the mental pictures are immanent: 
                                                                                                                                                        
the critical edition (Husserl 1979, 303–348) is unreliable for our purposes, since 
it was based on the last developmental stage of the text. 
25 Husserl 1990, 142; ET: Rollinger 1999, 251. 
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[T]he phantasy picture is inside the presentation and the object is, or not is, out-
side. In either case the presentation is not at all affected by whether or not the 
object is, will be, or has been.26 
Besides that these mental pictures could neither be found in the con-
sciousness nor would a picture alone explain the mechanism of intention-
al reference, the main problem with this compellingly easy solution is that 
it overlooks the real challenge of the paradox: 
But does not the sense of the […] statements discussed above imply that it is in 
each case the same object which is presented and exists or does not exist? The 
same Berlin that I present also exists, and the same would no longer exist if 
judgment were brought it down as in the case of Sodom and Gomorrha.27 
In other words, the intentional object is the real object and there is no oth-
er object behind it. The proposed disjunctive solution only begs the ques-
tion. Husserl’s clear-cut rejection of the disjunctive solution already ex-
emplifies the phenomenology’s basic commitment, but what is at stake is 
how to implement it – especially with respect to anomalies like the case 
of objectless presentations. 
Husserl explicitly rejects the solution Twardowski proposed which, 
he says, shares the same mistake:  
Here I see again the false duplication which became fatal to the picture theory: 
The immanent object […] cannot be anything but the true object wherever truth 
corresponds to the presentation. […] Whether we merely present Berlin or judge 
it as existing, it is still Berlin itself.28 
Husserl is apparently unaware of the real nature of Twardowski’s solution. 
His critique might apply at Brentano’s notion of intentionality, which, ac-
cording to usual interpretation, identifies the intentional object with an 
immanent object although, as discussed earlier, it is far from being certain 
that Brentano himself was committed to such a simplistic view. But 
Höfler and Twardowski were definitely not committed to this thesis. 
Quite the contrary, they have introduced the content-object distinction 
precisely in order to account for the difference between the real object 
and an immanent mental entity. 
                                                 
26 Husserl 1990, 143; ET: Rollinger 1999, 252. 
27 Husserl 1990, 144; ET: Rollinger 1999, 252–253. 
28 Husserl 1990, 146; ET: Rollinger 1999, 255. 
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At the end of his argumentation, Husserl explicitly accuses Twar-
dowski of committing a serious breach of the laws of logic:  
If a round square is immanent in the presentation […], then there would be a 
round square in the presentation. […] Since the presentations really exist, then 
the existence of each and every absurdity also would have to be fully and com-
pletely admitted. The realm of the objects and states of affairs immanent in the 
presentations would not be subject to mathematical and logical laws.29 
In a remark written a decade later Husserl even added: “Precisely this is 
what Meinong has recently proposed in his book on Gegenstandstheorie in 
1907.”30 However, as discussed above, Husserl’s critique completely miss-
es the point. Twardowski was far from advocating a disjunctivist solution. 
Quite the contrary, he tried to solve the problem of the intentionality of ob-
jectless presentation by assigning them an existence in a modified sense, 
which anticipates Meinong’s introduction of Aussersein, a mode of being 
beyond actual existence and ideal subsistence. This is particularly visible in 
Twardowski’s first university lecture course in Vienna, which he hold in the 
winter semester of 1894/1895, after finishing his book in late 1893 and suc-
cessfully passing his habilitation e[amination in -uly 19 (Brożek 2011, 
148f.). In this unpublished lecture, Twardowski first considered whether ob-
jectless presentations have an empty extension (Ms. Twardowski 54, 56). 
This position is reminiscent of Höfler’s handbook, according to which the 
objectless presentations have an empty “logical extension” (cf. Höfler 
1890, 30), and it already diverges from Bolzano’s original definition of ob-
jectless presentations. Then he introduces an argument which reminds us of 
the existential import of proposition in order to reject Höfler’s position: 
Cannot we say that as the round square is a geometric figure that cannot be 
drawn. Here I make a judgment – yet not on my presentation of the round 
square, but on the round square itself, the object of my presentation of the round 
square. [...] So an object corresponds to these presentations, but this object does 
not exist. Yes, not only an object but an infinite number of objects correspond to 
these presentations. I can imagine a round square with the area of about 2 square 
centimeters or 3, 4, 5 and so forth in infinitum.31 
                                                 
29 Husserl 1990, 147; ET: Rollinger 1999, 256. 
30 Husserl’s marginal note in pencil (Ms. Husserl K I 56/10, not part of the editions 
quoted above, cf. Husserl 1979, 458). 
31 Ms. Twardowski 54, 57 (italicization corresponds to underlining in original). 
 
Authenticated | peter.andras.varga@gmail.com author's copy
Download Date | 1/16/16 6:27 AM
 THE NON-EXISTING OBJECT REVISITED 43 
Twardowski also explicitly acknowledges that judgements (Urteile) re-
quire us to assume the object we are judging – it is just that this object 
does not exist. This is where Twardowski clearly anticipates a philosophi-
cal position that Meinong would take some years later (even if Meinong’s 
stance on the existential import was more differentiated). Had Husserl di-
rectly confront the solution Twardowski proposed, his text could have 
been used for building a multistage link between his notion of intentional-
ity and Meinong’s position, which in turn could have been connected to 
Russell’s criticism. But Husserl failed to do so. There is, however, an in-
teresting claim in Twardowski’s treatment of objectless presentations in 
his unpublished Vienna lectures. He rightly points out that the extension 
is actually infinite, rather than empty, as it is possible to imagine various 
round squares. This again highlights the significance of the aspect that 
was classified by Bolzano as being merely subjective. 
 
3. The Direct Link: Husserl on Meinong and Russell in 1907 
By the time of Russell’s debate with Meinong, the relationship between 
Husserl and Meinong seriously deteriorated, burdened by conflicts over 
priority and, implicitly, even over plagiarism.32 These conflicts also pre-
                                                                                                                                                        
“Kann ich nicht sagen: das runde Viereck ist eine geometrische Figur, die man 
nicht zeichnen kann. Hier fälle ich ein Urteil – aber nicht über meine Vorstel-
lung des runden Vierecks, sondern über das runde Viereck selbst, den Gegen-
stand meiner Vorstellung des runden Vierecks. […] Also auch diesen Vorstellun-
gen entspricht ein Gegenstand, nur existiert er nicht. Ja, nicht nur ein Gegen-
stand, sondern unendlich viele entsprechen diesen Vorstellungen. Ich kann mir 
ein rundes Viereck vorstellen von etwa 2Ƒcm [Quadratzentimeter] Fläche, von 3, 
4[,] 5Ƒcm u.s.w. in infinit[um].” 
32 On this infamous episode of the history of the Brentano-School see Carlo Ierna’s 
excellent recent study (Ierna 2009). Although Ierna opts for the charitable con-
clusion that “great minds think alike” (ibid., 8), i.e. the “similarities in their the-
ories […] seem to point rather in the direction of common sources than to sug-
gest plagiarism in some sense or other” (ibid., 28), his discovery of Husserl’s 
lapsus calami at a page reference to Mill in Husserl’s habilitation thesis (ibid., 
14) clearly indicates that Husserl took over a quote from Meinong without 
properly referencing him. Husserl’s tendency to underexpose his indebtedness to 
Meinong, coupled with his sweeping claim that there is no “generally accepted 
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vented Meinong from reading the aforementioned 1894 text that Husserl 
offered him in 1902 (Husserl 1994a, vol. 1, 147). At the same time, the 
years after the turn of the century constituted a crucial period for the for-
mation of Husserl’s own philosophy. It was in his 1906/07 lecture on log-
ic and epistemology that he first correctly formulated the phenomenologi-
cal reduction, which concluded the transformation of his phenomenology 
from descriptive psychology into a full-fledged philosophy. This lecture 
course was preceded by a period of recollection, rereading and organizing 
his earlier manuscripts during the autumn of 1906. It was in the summer 
of 1906 that Husserl secured a stable academic position, as he was pro-
moted to a university position comparable with full professorship and his 
salary was also raised. In the course of making an inventory of his philo-
sophical tasks, Husserl also explicitly mentioned Meinong: 
A discussion with Meinong will, for obvious reasons, be necessary and una-
voidable – not to mention the fact that it must at some point be shown that in ac-
tuality the domains of investigation and the most essential points established are 
common to both sides. We are like two people traveling in one and the same 
dark continent. Naturally we frequently see and describe the same things, but of-
ten differently, corresponding to our different masses.33 
In academic circles it has been assumed so far hat Husserl’s planned con-
frontation with Meinong’s philosophy did not eventually happen. There 
is, however, a critique of Meinong written by Husserl in the late summer 
of 1907 that is relatively or probably completely unknown, as it has pre-
viously not been transcribed from Husserl’s idiosyncratic shorthand.34 
                                                                                                                                                        
theory of relations” (Husserl 1970, 66, cf. 328), definitely suffices to justify 
Meinong’s anger, which is mirrored in the letter he wrote in his first outrage but 
later apparently restrained himself from sending it (Meinong 1965, 94–96). 
33 Husserl 1984, 444; ET: Husserl 1994b, 492. 
34 The text is preserved in the manuscript convolute Ms. Husserl K III 33 / 25–27. 
While the preceding manuscript subdivision (28–31) was already recognized by 
K. Schuhmann as being Husserl’s excerpt of his copy of Meinong 1907 (see 
Schuhmann 1977, 108), the preceding subdivision seems to be hitherto un-
known. It was not even mentioned in Robin D. Rollinger’s discussion of Hus-
serl’s reaction to Meinong’s book (Rollinger 1999, 206–207). The subdivisions 
between 21 and 34 are missing from the early handwritten transcription of K III 
33. There is a clear terminus post quem for Husserl’s text on Meinong and Rus-
sell, since one of its page is written on the reverse side of an invitation to a fac-
ulty meeting, dated July 23, 1907 (26b). 
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What makes this short piece of text entitled “The confrontation between 
Meinong and Russell over the law of noncontradiction”35 especially inter-
esting is that Husserl directly reads, excerpts and comments upon Rus-
sell’s articles on Meinong. One might remark that Husserl’s reading of 
Russell’s reviews published in the July issue of Mind would probably be a 
quick reaction time even in our age.36  
Russell’s last two reviews of Meinong, published in 1905 and 1907, 
already mark the ascending phase of his interest in Meinong’s philosophy. 
Having arrived at his own theory of eliminating non-existing objects, 
Russell was no more interested in motivations he believed to have re-
ceived from Meinong, and started to formulate serious objections against 
Meinong’s Gegenstandstheorie. Already in his 1905 review, published in 
the same issue as “On Denoting”, Russell formulated his own “master ar-
guments” against Meinong’s admission of impossible objects: 
[T]he difficulty is that impossible objects often subsist, and even exist. For if the 
round square is round and square, the existent round square is existent and 
round and square. Thus something round and square exists, although everything 
round and square is impossible. (Russell 1905c, 533) 
A year later, Meinong wrote a programmatic summary of the merits of his 
full-fledged Gegenstandstheorie (Meinong 1907), first published between 
1906 and 1907 in three installments, in which he tried to answer his crit-
ics, including Russell, whose objections, as he admitted, “were especially 
penetrating” (Meinong 1907, 16). 
Meinong was defenseless against Russell’s master argument, and he 
could only resort to invoking the distinction between existence as a predi-
cate and as a copula (ibid., 17). Having received the first installment of 
Meinong’s treatise, Russell immediately wrote him a letter (Meinong 
1965, 151–152) signalizing that he finds this distinction unconvincing – 
                                                 
35 “Auseinandersetzung zwischen Meinong und Russell über den Satz vom Wider-
spruch”, Ms. Husserl K III 33 / 25a. 
36 While Husserl owned copies of several books by Meinong and Russell, he did not 
subscribe to the Mind itself. He probably read it in the library of the University of 
Göttingen, where he had been teaching since October 1901 (a full historical series 
of the journal is present in the university library), which testifies the long-
standing Anglophone orientation of this university. In contrast, Hugh MacColl, 
Russell’s other debate partner had problems with obtaining copies of Mind in 
Northern France. 
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something he already said in his 1905 review. It is indeed very hard to re-
ply to Russell’s master argument, since, as John Findlay has already point-
ed out in his pioneering book on Meinong (Findlay 1963), even if one re-
plies by distinguishing between the predicate ‘existence’ and the property 
of being existent, Russell’s argument could be iterated by predicating the 
latter property and so forth in infinitum. One might use formalized logical 
devices to construct a version of Meinong’s theory that avoids this conse-
quence, but the Gegenstandstheorie would certainly loose much of its in-
tuitive appeal.37 For Russell it was not necessary to have recourse to iter-
ating his master arguments, as he was, justly, convinced that his theory of 
descriptions provides a superior solution to the original problem. 
Husserl was reading Meinong’s treatise in parallel with Russell’s re-
view of it (Husserl made German excerpts of them), and he was observ-
ing, with morose delectation, the increasing difficulties Meinong was 
running into and he called the controversy “truly entertaining”.38 Husserl 
apparently agreed with Russell’s point that Meinong cannot elude the law 
of contradiction by claiming that it only applies to actual or possible ob-
jects – as Meinong argued in a text (1907, 16) which Husserl also ex-
cerpted at length (Ms. Husserl K III 33 / 25a) including Russell’s earlier 
objection (Russell 1905c, 533) –, because “[t]his reply seems to overlook 
the fact that it is of propositions (i.e. of ‘Objectives’ in Meinong’s termi-
nology) […] that the law […] is asserted” (Russell 1907, 533). Husserl 
also noted this page number and excerpted the summary of Russell’s ar-
gument, adding the marginal note “sehr richtig!” (Ms. Husserl K III 33 / 
25a). What makes this especially interesting is that it is this particular text 
passage (Russell 1907, 533) in which Russell referred the readers to his 
main paper “On Denoting”. 
Husserl, however, apparently ignored this hint and returned to 
Meinong’s argumentation against Russell in his 1907 book. He spoke 
ironically of Meinong’s “profound” (tiefsinnige) attempt at avoiding Rus-
sell’s master argument, and constructed an even more complex – though 
                                                 
37 M. Thrush has recently considered a slightly amended version of Meinong’s Ge-
genstandstheorie and concluded that there are indeed unavoidable, though artifi-
cially constructed examples which entail contradiction (Thrush 2001). See also 
note 39 below. 
38 “wirklich amüsant”, Ms. Husserl K III 33/ 26a. 
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not necessarily decisive – counterexample: “a non-existing existing some-
thing”.39 Husserl then turned to another attempt by Meinong to elude Rus-
sell’s critique. In a text excerpted by Husserl Meinong argued: “By the 
way, Russell’s whole argumentation is about impossibilia [unmögliche 
Gegenstände], thereby he himself provides the evidence that our thinking 
may very well engage in such objects.” (Meinong 1907, 18) This was, 
however, a particularly ill-fortuned argument by Meinong which clearly 
shows what a bad debater he was. In the review written by Russell in 
1905, which Meinong was explicitly answering, Russell was still aware 
that Meinong was not committed to the existential import of proposition, 
though Russell believed it would have spoken for Meinong’s case: 
There is, Meinong admits […], one -strong argument in favour of [Meinong’s 
position …]. But this argument, he says, depends upon regarding a proposition 
as a complex, and its subject as a constituent of it; and such a view, he thinks 
can only be taken figuratively. I should have thought the subject of a proposition 
was a constituent of a complex […], and that therefore the argument would be 
sound.40 
In his book of 1907 Meinong then jumped at this “sound argument”, 
which was actually contrary to his position as he knew at best,41 thereby 
walking into the trap of Russell, since by that time Russell had already 
moved beyond the existential import of propositions. In 1907 he was able 
to answer Meinong triumphantly: 
                                                 
39 “Ein nicht-existierendes Existierendes” (Ms. K III 33 / 26a). At first sight, it is 
not obvious whether Husserl’s challenge is harder than Russell’s master argu-
ment. Husserl might have tried to point at an object possessing contradicting 
properties, but this is not considered posing a special difficulty for Meinong’s 
theory (Thrush 2001, 162 ff.), which is only endangered by a special “exporta-
tion” construction that efficiently undermines Meinong’s distinction between an 
object and the objectives relating to it. 
40 Russell 1905c, 532–533. The passage to which Russell referred is quoted in note 
6 above. 
41 In his earlier book, to which Russell referred, Meinong was still clearly aware 
that such an argument would lead to an “existing object” (Meinong 1904, 12), 
but he must have also been alerted by the fact that in the above quote Russell 
rendered his position as “the subsistence of the [non-existing] objects” (Russell 
1905c, 533). This was, of course, contrary to Meinong’s aim to ascribe only 
Aussersein to such objects (which Russell, actually, knew very well, since he 
immediately added a clause: “which he [Meinong] regards as non-subsistent”, 
ibid.). 
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To this I reply that I was careful to provide an interpretation of propositions in 
which such objects seem to occur and that therefore Meinong’s argument was 
answered by anticipation. (Russell 1907, 439) 
Husserl carefully noted down Meinong’s attempt as well as Russell’s an-
swer.42 This is the very sentence where Russell inserted a footnote with a 
reference to his famous theory of descriptions (Russell 1905b, 490). Hus-
serl wrote down this reference as well, but he, unfortunately, did not 
comment upon that.43 
The only remark Husserl made, at the very end of his text, is “Com-
pare my letter to Meinong on May 22, 1891.”44 This is an interesting ref-
erence which closes the circle, since it leads back to Husserl’s pre-
phenomenological days. In the early 1890, as discussed in Section 2, Hus-
serl was working on topics mainly concerning foundational problem of 
mathematics, which he addressed by descriptive psychological means. 
1891 is precisely the year of Husserl’s deepest foray into the philosophy 
of logic and mathematics, when he tried to join the ongoing German de-
bate between intensional and extensional logic. Husserl sided with those 
who, like Wilhelm Wundt, tried to preclude the priority claims of English-
style, i.e. pre-Russell, class logic by trying to shows that it necessarily 
presupposes intentional concepts. Not only did Husserl review the book 
by the mathematician Ernst Schröder, a pioneer of the German reception 
of 19th century English logic, but he also published a logical treatise in 
the same year in which he attempted to provide a concrete transformation 
that reduces extensional class-relations between concepts into intensional 
relations, i.e. claims about the contents (Inhalte) of these concepts under-
stood as a collection of features (Merkmale). Husserl’s foray finally ended 
                                                 
42 “Ferner auf das letzte <Argument>, dass mit all dem Russell doch Aussagen 
über unmögliche Objekte mache und sie so implicite zugesteht, antwortet Rus-
sell: Er sei sorgfältig bekümmert gewesen, to provide eine <vor eine gestr. Re-
chenschaft zu geben für> Interpretation von Propositionen, in welchen solche 
Objekte aufzutreten scheinen, und dass somit Meinongs Argument nichts besage 
(Mind, Oktober 1905, 490).” (Ms. Husserl K III 33 / 27a) 
43 It is unclear whether Husserl also had the 1905 issue of Mind in his hands. His 
only reference to this volume (Russell 1905c, 533, cf. Ms. Husserl K III 33 / 
25a) might have directly been copied from Meinong 1907, 16, n 3, especially 
since in the next sentence Husserl went on to excerpt precisely this passage of 
Meinong. 
44 “Vgl. dazu meinen Brief an Meinong vom 22. 5. 91.” (Ms. Husserl K III 33 / 27a) 
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in a bitter priority and plagiarism debate with one of his German col-
leagues, but at that time he sent his treatises to Meinong, whose response 
prompted him to write a lengthy letter further developing the details of his 
proposed transformation. Apparently this is the letter he considered rele-
vant 16 years later.  
In the original treatise, one of the points Husserl clarified explicated 
was related precisely to the deductive properties of the empty set, which 
Husserl identified with the extension of the “concept of non-existence”. 
(Husserl 1979, 59; ET: Husserl 1994b, 107) Thereby he had to address the 
validity of sentences predicating a property about a non-existing object 
(e.g. ‘A round square is red’). In alignment with the existentially non-
binding class-logical interpretation of such sentences, Husserl allowed for 
any feature to be predicated about such objects, 
in fact, if n is non-existent, then that same n is a non-existent as a red, sweet, or 
non-red (etc.) thing; and to the non-existent as such, therefore, all properties ac-
tually belong. (Husserl 1979, 35; ET: Husserl 1994b, 83) 
It is worth noting that, as Hugh MacColl’s paper testifies (see e.g. Mac-
Coll 1905, 78), this was a problem inherent in the Boolean systems which 
had general currency at that time, and Russell attacked MacColl precisely 
using a rudimental version of his theory of descriptions (cf. Russell 
1905a, 399). 
In his letter Husserl corrected this view, precisely because by then he 
thought that the predicative sentence ‘S is P’ is false in case of non-existing 
subjects, i.e. the predicative sentence implies that “something is presented 
as having the feature” (Husserl 1994a, vol. 1, 124). In the original treatise, 
he had an axiom, which allowed for any feature to be predicated about 
non-existing objects. He still believed that such a claim could be proved by 
substituting negative properties and using double negation, but it is far 
from being an axiom. It is rather a “paradox”, allowing for the deduction of 
contrary sentences, which, as Husserl says, highlights the absurdity result-
ing from “hypostatizing the existence of something non-existing, which 
directly violates the fundamental logical principles” (ibid.). 
In this letter, which represents Husserl’s final opinion in this matter, 
Husserl thus committed himself to the view that non-existing objects 
could not be admitted as valid objects; and, 16 years later, in retrospect 
this seemed to be the adequate explanation for him for the absurd conse-
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quences Meinong’s theory was facing. One might say that Husserl was 
actually getting very close to Russell’s solution, especially since he was 
using the formulation “if there is anything possessing the feature A ...”. 
There was, indeed, a certain degree of similarity. Actually, there was an 
abundance of attempts by contemporaneous German and Austrian philos-
ophers at eliminating non-existing objects by transforming sentences con-
taining them into sentences about the properties of existing objects (in-
cluding, as discussed earlier, one of the options partly utilized by 
Twardowski). So it could be safely assumed that such a transformation – 
of course, without the corresponding logical apparatus – would have been 
available to the members of the School of Brentano, including Husserl, 
had they wished to use it. This further underlines the strange fact that in 
1907 Husserl was not paying any attention to Russell’s solution. This is 
something he shared with Meinong, who did not say anything relevant 
about the solution proposed by Russell either, which probably led Russell 
to lose his interest in Meinong once and for all. Therefore, at least from 
the Russell’s point of view, it was not regrettable that Husserl’s conversa-
tion with Meinong and Russell in 1907 remained a soliloquy. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
It seems that the prima facie lesson of the above historical investigation is 
of negative nature. Given the missed chances of a real interaction between 
Husserl and the philosophers at the other side of the Channel, it is com-
pelling to use the shared context of these philosophies around the turn of 
the previous century to establish a meaningful link between the philo-
sophical movements that later gave rise to analytic and continental phi-
losophy. A quick glance at the last pages of the issue of Mind in which 
Russell’s celebrated “On Denoting” was published could suffice to dispel 
the myth of isolation and hostility between Russell and his Continental 
counterparts. What is less obvious, however, is how Russell’s critique of 
Meinong could be used to construct a relevant connection to Husserl’s 
phenomenology. My paper has considered the main path through Hus-
serl’s critique of Twardowski in 1894. While Twardowski’s book criti-
cized by Husserl is undeniably situated in the main debate on intentionali-
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ty by the disciples of Brentano, and the most charitable reading of 
Twardowski’s position points towards Meinong’s later full-fledged Ge-
genstandstheorie, Husserl seriously misconstrued Twardowski’s position, 
overlooking precisely the aspect which makes Meinong’s theory worth 
considering. It is thus theoretically possible to trace the path between 
Russell’s and Husserl’s positions, but it would require a considerable 
broader – and less linear – chain of incremental position changes. 
This is why Husserl’s hitherto unknown direct confrontation with 
Russell’s critique of Meinong in 1907 initially sounded promising. Hus-
serl closely followed Meinong’s struggle with Russell’s critique indeed, 
which itself was burdened by unfortunate choices on Meinong’s part. 
Husserl’s stance toward this debate was again marked by a stubborn re-
sistance against considering Russell’s actual argument. He only referred 
himself to his earlier correspondence with Meinong on the interpretation 
of sentences about non-existing objects, in which he moved from an ini-
tial permissive position resembling the ones attacked by Russell in early 
1905 to a more prohibitive one. Despite this reference, he refrained him-
self in 1907 from utilizing any of the techniques which would have 
brought him closer to Russell’s theory of descriptions. 
While such a negative conclusion could be regarded as an important 
addition to our historical understanding of the complex interrelation of the 
early phenomenology and the nascent analytic philosophy; it is still possi-
ble to highlight a philosophically relevant lesson. This, however, lies not in 
the ontology of the non-existing object, but rather in the achievements re-
quired for the cognizance of such objects. I have already highlighted occa-
sions when such a requirement was formulated by Bolzano and Twar-
dowski, but it is also worth looking at what Paul Natorp, the Neo-Kantian 
philosopher who edited another text of Husserl on Twardowski, said: 
[…] the judgment ‘There are no round squares’ is not a judgment about the ob-
ject corresponding to the concept ‘round square’ […], but rather about the con-
cept, namely that there is no object corresponding to it. But even this concept is 
an improper one. It is […] actually the concept of something that would have 
been simultaneously round and square, had it been possible – rather than a con-
cept of something that actually unites these two features. (Husserl 1994a, vol. 1, 
46) 
Natorp thus highlighted an aspect of the problem my paper has already 
encountered above: the failed achievement to form such a concept. This 
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letter was written in 1897, at the time when Husserl was already working 
on the Logical Investigations, and it was precisely Natorp to whom Hus-
serl declared that the main aim of his work in progress was not only to 
combat psychologism, but also to render the relation between pure logical 
laws and psychological acts comprehensible (Husserl 1994a, 5, 52–53). 
The terminus of this journey is Husserl’s mature position on the inten-
tionality of non-existing objects, which is to be found in the Ideas III, 
marking the end of his development to the full-fledged transcendental 
phenomenology:  
[…] we see now that what is thought as such (logical signification in the noe-
matic sense) can be ‘countersensical’ that it – which, after all, ‘exists’ within the 
category of being ‘logical signification’, and more generally, ‘noema’ – has its 
actual being, as for example, the thought signification ‘round rectangle’. […] 
the essence of what is signified is also something other than the signification. 
There is no essence ‘round rectangle’; but in order to be able to judge this, it is 
presupposed that ‘round rectangle’ is a signification existing in this unitari-
ness.45 
A round square can be thought of (phenomenologically speaking, this 
process is described by the noetical correlates of the noema ‘round 
square’), but there is no such object ideally taken (in phenomenological 
parlance: there is no essence ‘round rectangle’). Even though there is no 
direct continuous path connecting Russell’s critique of Meinong and the 
development of Husserl’s mature, transcendental notion of intentionality, 
the problem of non-existing objects is not accidental to the latter either.46 
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